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ABSTRACT
Instrumented environments, such as modern building automation
systems (BAS), are becoming commonplace and are increasingly
interconnected with (and sometimes by) enterprise networks and
the Internet. Regardless of the underlying communication platform,
secure control of devices in such environments is a challenging
task. The current trend is to move from proprietary communication
media and protocols to IP over Ethernet. While the move to IP
represents progress, new and different Internet architectures might
be better-suited for instrumented environments.
In this paper, we consider security of instrumented environments
in the context of Content-Centric Networking (CCN). In particular,
we focus on building automation over Named-Data Networking
(NDN), a prominent instance of CCN. After identifying security
requirements in a specific BAS sub-domain (lighting control), we
construct a concrete NDN-based security architecture, analyze its
properties and report on preliminary implementation and experimen-
tal results. We believe that this work represents a useful exercise in
assessing the utility of NDN in securing a communication paradigm
well outside of its claimed forte of content distribution. At the same
time, we provide a viable (secure and efficient) communication
platform for a class of instrumented environments exemplified by
lighting control.
1 Introduction
The Internet has clearly proven to be a tremendous global success.
Billions of people worldwide use it to perform a wide range of every-
day tasks. It hosts a large number of information-intensive services,
involves enormous amounts of content created and consumed over
the Web, and interconnects untold millions of wired, wireless, fixed
and mobile computing devices.
Since Internet’s inception, the amount of data exchanged over it
has witnessed exponential growth. Recently, this growth intensified
due to increases in: (1) distribution of multimedia content, (2) popu-
larity of social networks and (3) amount of user-generated content.
Unfortunately, the same usage model that fueled Internet’s success
is also exposing its limitations. Core ideas of today’s Internet were
developed in the 1970-s, when telephony – i.e., a point-to-point
conversation between two entities – was the only successful exam-
ple of effective global-scale communication technology. Moreover,
original Internet applications were few and modest in nature, e.g.,
store-and-forward email and remote computer access.
The world has changed dramatically since the 1970-s and the
Internet now has to accommodate new services and applications
as well as different usage models. To keep pace with changes and
move the Internet into the future, several research efforts to design
new Internet architectures have been initiated in recent years.
Named-Data Networking (NDN) [30] is an on-going research
project that aims to develop a candidate next-generation Internet ar-
chitecture. NDN exemplifies the so-called Content-Centric approach
[18, 24, 28] to networking. It explicitly names content instead of
physical locations (i.e., hosts or network interfaces) and thus trans-
forms content into a first-class entity. NDN also stipulates that each
piece of named content must be digitally signed by its producer. This
allows decoupling of trust in content from trust in the entity that
might store and/or disseminate that content. These NDN features
facilitate automatic caching of content to optimize bandwidth use
and enable effective simultaneous utilization of multiple network
interfaces.
NDN’s long-term goal is to replace TCP/IP. In order to succeed,
NDN must prove that it can be used to efficiently implement all
kinds of communication commonly performed over IP today and
envisaged for the near future. NDN has been shown as a viable
architecture for content distribution [24] as well as real-time [23]
and anonymous communication [6]. However, it remains unclear
how NDN would fare in the context of other, less content-centric,
communication paradigms, such as: cyber-physical systems (CPS),
group communication (e.g., conferencing) and instrumented envi-
ronments (e.g., building automation).
1.1 Building Automation and
Lighting Control
Building Automation Systems (BAS) provide a hardware and soft-
ware platform for control, monitoring and management of: heating,
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, water, physical
access control and other building components. BAS are subject to
several important current trends with security implications:
• Increasing use of IP and Ethernet for industrial control, often
over commodity wiring and network hardware.
• Convergence of previously separate networks for automation
and IT enabled by this new common infrastructure.
• Increasing interest in cyber-physical systems (CPS) that lever-
age internetworking of physical and digital elements to enable
and develop new types of applications.
In general, BAS offers an interesting and challenging application
domain for NDN because content-centric networking is generally
discussed in terms of its improvements to content retrieval, as op-
posed to control, actuation, or remote execution. In the domain of
BAS, we focus on lighting control as the initial test platform for the
design and implementation of control communication over NDN.
This choice is based on three reasons: (1) lighting represents a broad
class of actuators while incurring limited physical safety concerns;
(2) prevalence of IP-based control of lighting fixtures in new archi-
tectural and entertainment deployments; (3) access to comparisons
with IP- and serially-controlled systems.
In designing an NDN lighting control framework, our goals are:
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1. Satisfy low latency requirements for communication between
software (or hardware) controllers and lighting fixtures.
2. Use NDN content naming to address all components of the
system, with names related to their identity or function rather
than a combination of addressing that spans layers and sys-
tems (e.g., VLAN tag, IP address of gateway, port of protocol,
address of fixture) as in current implementations.
3. Given that NDN makes widespread use of content signatures,
identify every entity in the system by a distinct public key.
4. Control access to fixtures via authorization policies, coupled
with strong authentication. (Current BAS and lighting sys-
tems typically rely on physical or VLAN-based segregation
for security, making interoperability with IT systems challeng-
ing, configurations brittle to change, and requiring advanced
networking expertise to set up and maintain.)
5. Use NDN naming itself to reflect access restrictions, rather
than require a separate policy language. The main motiva-
tion is that a namespace is consistently accessible within any
NDN-compliant device or process. This obviates the need for
application-specific access control protocols.
6. Develop security mechanisms suitable for low-power systems,
initially targeting cell-phone class devices with a planned
transition to microcontrollers typical of IP-connected lights
today, such as the Phillips Color Kinetics ColorBlaze, that
uses a 72-MHz ARM processor.
1.2 Securing Lighting Control
Current lighting control installations, especially in non-critical
facilities, tend to rely on network segregation and/or VLANs and
VPNs to isolate their control traffic from general-purpose IP com-
munication. everal trends, such as increasing emphasis on energy
management and the “smart grid” suggest that this will not remain
a viable approach in the future: Instrumented environments have
increasing reliance on the Internet for patches and updates, remote
access, data gathering, and application integration, as well as increas-
ing opportunities for integration in homes and other environments
without enterprise-level security. Consequently, we believe that,
in the near future, it will become increasingly difficult to provide
effective security by network separation alone: the most compelling
applications depend on interfaces across system and network bound-
aries. VLANs, IP subnetting, and other network configurations
spread addressing information across network layers in a way that
is rarely meaningful to end-users or application developers.
Besides lower complexity and greater interoperability, running
lighting control applications over public networks brings certain
advantages. First, there is no need to design, deploy and manage a
separate network infrastructure, since lighting control can benefit
from high-speed, low-latency, fault-tolerant networks already de-
ployed for general-purpose communication needs. Second, lighting
control can be physically distributed, with devices spanning build-
ings and sites, and applications accessing them from a variety of
locations. Third, separate (often esoteric and proprietary) security
measures common in today’s lighting control would be unnecessary,
due to availability of standardized security features and techniques.
1.3 Focus
This paper is focused on securing lighting control systems run-
ning over NDN. As mentioned above, allowing control messages to
reach actual lighting fixtures (as opposed to dedicated controllers)
imposes strict performance constraints, in addition to more general
requirements of availability and fault tolerance. While general BAS
might tolerate variable delays up to a few seconds for actuating or
sensing slowly changing systems, latency requirements for light-
ing control are stricter and represent an overlap with industrial and
process control. To provide a sense of “real-time” interaction, archi-
tectural lighting might require execution of commands within a few
hundred milliseconds of pressing a switch, or updates close to 44Hz
DMX refresh rate [9] to achieve a smooth fade from one value to an-
other. By designing and implementing a secure lighting framework
suitable for such low latency systems coupled with a meaningful
namespace, we target a hybrid design space that corresponds to the
so-called “thin waist” for highly heterogenous BAS of the future.
Organization: We proceed with NDN overview in Section 2. It is
followed by the description of a base-line lighting control protocol
in Section 3. The same section introduces our framework. Imple-
mentation details and performance evaluation results are discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 contains the security analysis. Next, Section
6 summarizes related work. The paper concludes with future work
agenda and a summary in Section 7.
2 Overview of NDN
NDN [30] is a communication architecture based on named content.
Rather than addressing content by its location, NDN refers to it
by name. A content name is composed of one or more variable-
length components. Component boundaries are explicitly delimited
by “/”. For example, the name of a CNN news content might be:
/ndn/cnn/news/2011aug20. Large pieces of content can be split
into fragments with predictable names: fragment 137 of a YouTube
video could be named: /ndn/youtube/video-749.avi/137.
Since the main abstraction is content, there is no explicit notion of
“hosts” in NDN. (However, their existence is assumed.) Communi-
cation adheres to the pull model: content is delivered to consumers
only upon explicit request. A consumer requests content by sending
an interest packet. If an entity (a router or a host) can “satisfy” a
given interest, it returns the corresponding content object. Inter-
est and content are the only types of packets in NDN. A content
packet with name X in NDN is never forwarded or routed unless it
is preceded by an interest for name X.1
When a router receives an interest for name X and there are no
pending interests for the same name in its PIT (Pending Interests
Table), it forwards the interest to the next hop, according to its
routing table. For each forwarded interest, a router stores some state
information, including the name in the interest and the interface
on which it was received. However, if an interest for X arrives
while there is already an entry for the same name in the PIT, the
router collapses the present interest (and any subsequent ones for X)
storing only the interface on which it was received. When content is
returned, the router forwards it out on all interfaces from which an
interest for X has been received and flushes the corresponding PIT
entry. Note that, since no additional information is needed to deliver
content, an interest does not carry a “source” address. Any NDN
router can provide content caching; its magnitude is limited only by
resource availability. Consequently, content might be fetched from
routers caches, rather than from its original producer. (Hence, no
“destination” addresses are used in NDN). Further details of NDN
architecture can be found in [24].
NDN deals with content authenticity and integrity by making
digital signatures mandatory for all content. A signature binds
content with its name, and provides origin authentication no matter
how, when or from where it is retrieved. Public keys are treated
as regular content: since all content is signed, each public key
content is effectively a “certificate”. NDN does not mandate any
particular certification infrastructure, relegating trust management
1Strictly speaking, content named X′ 6= X can be delivered in response to an interest
for X, but only if X is a prefix of X′.
Interest: /ndn/application/cmd
Interest: /ndn/fixture/application
Content (Ack): ok
Application Fixture
Generate Signature on cmd
Verify Signature
Execute cmd
Generate Signature on cmd
Verify Signature
Content: cmd
Figure 1: Base-line protocol.
Interest (signed): /ndn/fixture/cmd
Content (Ack): ok
Application Fixture
Generate Signature
Verify Signature
Execute cmd
Generate Signature on cmd
Verify Signature
Figure 2: Protocol with authenticated interests.
to individual applications. Private or restricted content in NDN is
protected via encryption by the content publisher.
3 Lighting Control over NDN
Our setup involves four parties: a configuration manager (CM),
one or more fixtures (Fix), one or more applications (App) and an
authorization manager (AM). CM is in charge of the initial fixture
configuration. This includes, on a per-fixture basis: assigning a
fixture its NDN namespace, installing a trusted public key (owned
by AM) that identifies the local domain, and giving a fixture its
identity represented by a unique public key. Note that, in NDN
parlance, “namespace” refers to content published by some entity,
whereas, “identity” refers to a public key associated with some
entity that publishes content. AM determines which applications
are allowed to access each fixture, signs applications’ public keys
and (optionally) issues signed access control lists. While CM and
AM represent distinct functions, in practice, they are likely to be
physically co-located.
3.1 Base-Line Protocol
We start by observing that NDN can be easily used to securely
implement basic lighting control without requiring any new features
or components. As shown in Figure 1, when application App needs
to send a command to fixture Fix, the base-line protocol works as
follows:
1. App creates (and signs) a new content object cmd containing
the desired command.
2. App issues an interest intA with a name in Fix’s namespace
that references the name of cmd.
3. Fix receives intA, stores it in its PIT, and issues an interest
intF for the name of cmd.
4. App receives intF and responds with cmd.
5. Fix receives cmd, (1) checks its access control list to deter-
mine if App is authorized to execute the command in cmd,
(2) verifies the signature of cmd, (3) executes the command,
and (4) replies with an acknowledgement (from here on ab-
breviated as “ack”) in the form of a new signed content object
ack. Finally, Fix flushes intA from its PIT.
6. App receives ack and verifies its signature.
The main drawback of this protocol is its high latency and bandwidth
overhead: a single command requires 4 rounds and 4 messages,
instead of the ideal 2 rounds/messages (Also, as is well-known, pro-
tocol robustness suffers and complexity increases with the number
of rounds.) Thus, this approach is a poor match for delay-sensitive
lighting control.
Alternatively, Fix could continuously issue interests that solicit
App’s commands. This way, whenever App issues a new command,
it does so by simply satisfying the most recent interest. While this
approach would address the latency issue of the base-line protocol,
it introduces new problems.
First, Fix would have to always issue one interest per each App
allowed to control it. In an installation with multiple applications
(m) interacting with a large number of fixtures (n), the overhead of
periodic O(mn) interests would be significant. Also, an application
would be unable to generate a rapid burst of commands to the same
fixture, since the latter would operate in a lock-step fashion. (In
other words, App can only issue a new command after it receives
an interest from Fix).
3.2 Whither Authenticated Interests?
We now consider another approach that, at least in principle,
violates the tenets of NDN. Recall that NDN stipulates that all
content objects must be signed. Each entity implementing the NDN
protocol stack must be able to verify content signatures. Interests,
however, are not subject to the same requirement. One reason for
this design choice is efficiency: public-key signature generation
and verification is expensive. Moreover, signatures from different
parties prevent straightforward interest aggregation. Another reason
is privacy: traditional public-key signatures carry information about
the signer. There are, however, applications that could benefit from
authenticated interests and control of building systems like lighting
seems to be one.
Authenticated interests can be implemented using both public
key and symmetric authentication mechanisms, i.e., signatures and
message authentication codes (MACs), respectively. For the sake
of generality, we refer to the output of both as authentication tags.
Due to the flexibility of NDN naming, where name components
can be application-determined and are opaque to the network, an
authentication tag can be placed into an NDN name as a bona
fide component thereof. This way, an authentication tag becomes
transparent to NDN routers and only the target of the command
would interpret and verify it.
While MACs obviously perform much better than signatures,
they make auditing difficult: a MAC cannot be attributed to one
party. For this reason, if there is an auditing requirement – and
if timing constraints allow – we prefer signature when fixtures
are used as actuators (i.e., when commands generate feedback).
Whereas, MACs are naturally preferred when fixtures act as sensors,
i.e., when applications retrieve information from them. Regardless
of their type, computation of authentication tags must be random-
ized to ensure uniqueness, based on either nonces or timestamps.
However, this would inhibit aggregation of authenticated interests,
since each authentication tag would be distinct; hence, no two names
would be the same, with overwhelming probability.
In general, using authenticated interests is fairly straightforward,
as illustrated in Figure 2. CM configures each fixture with a specific
namespace and AM assigns a set of rights to each application, tied
with the application public key or to a symmetric key shared with
the fixture. The name reflected in an authenticated interest would
contain three parts: (1) prefix part (used for routing) that corresponds
to the fixture namespace, (2) actual command, and (3) randomizer
(nonce or timestamp) along with the authentication tag computed
over the rest of the name:
/ndn/fixture-namespace︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
/command︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
/randomizer||auth-tag︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
The idea is that, when Fix receives such an interest, it verifies the
authentication tag, executes the command and replies with a signed
ack as content. The first task (verifying the authentication tag) is
simple only if one application controls the fixture or if part 1 of
the name somehow uniquely identifies the requesting application.
Whereas, if multiple applications are allowed to issue the same
class of commands to a given fixture and use the same type of
authentication tags, the fixture would need to determine the exact
application by repeatedly verifying the authentication tag. This
could translate into costly delays. This issue can be easily remedied
by overloading NDN names even further and including another
explicit part that identifies the requesting application (or its key).
Another drawback of this (and the base-line) approach is that the
fixture needs to sign, in real-time, the acknowledgement, which
is represented as content. Since a typical fixture is a relatively
anemic computing device, signature generation might involve non-
negligible delays.
On the other hand, authenticated interests offer much faster (2-
message/2-round) operation than the base-line protocol described in
the previous section. Furthermore, an application can issue multiple
commands to the same fixture in rapid succession, i.e., without
waiting for an ack. (However, note that this could have negative
consequences if closely-spaced interests arrive out of order).
3.3 Secure Lighting Control Framework
Based on the preceding discussion, we conclude that a more spe-
cialized approach to secure lighting control over NDN is necessary
in order to obtain reasonable performance while adhering to NDN
principles. To this end, we construct a security framework that
includes:
• A trust model wherein public keys are associated with NDN
namespaces. The framework relies on this functionality to
determine the entity that “owns” a particular namespace. For
example, this allows us to ensure that a content object issued
by a fixture in response to a command has been generated by
the correct party.
• A syntax for key attributes and access control policies that
binds a public key with its attributes, as determined by the
signer (certifier) of this key.
• A protocol that defines how fixtures are initialized and how
applications and fixtures handle authenticated commands.
In the design of our framework, we consider an adversary that can
control the communication channel between App and Fix, i.e., it
can record, drop, modify, inject, delay, or replay any packet. The
goal of the adversary is to (1) produce a command of its choice that
is successfully executed by Fix; or (2) undetectably delay, or replay
legitimate commands from App; or (3) provide an acknowledgment
to App for a command that has not been executed.
3.4 Trust Model
NDN does not mandate the use of any particular trust model: each
application is free to adopt the trust model that best suits it. Our trust
model allows an entity (e.g., applications and fixtures) to publish
content only in its namespace or any of its children. (nameA is a
child of nameB if the latter is a prefix of the former).
Our trust model implements this restriction using public-key cryp-
tography. Zero or more public keys are associated with each names-
pace. A content object published under namespace name must be
signed using the key associated to name or any of its ancestors.
A trusted third party (TTP) – e.g., AM – generates the key-pair
Kroot = (pkroot, skroot) and distributes pkroot. This public key is
used as root of trust; a signature on a content object computed using
skroot is always accepted. In order to associate pkP , belonging
to producer P , with namespace nameP , TTP publishes, under
nameP /key, a content object containing pkP .
P can delegate a key sk′P 6= skP to sign content in namespace
nameP /sub-namespace by publishing the corresponding public
key pk′P under nameP /sub-namespace/key. This mechanism
allows TTP to delegate some of its certification capabilities to each
producer.
P can prove to anyone its ownership of a key linked to nameP
through a simple challenge-response protocol. The challenger issues
an interest for a content object with name nameP /nonce where
nonce is a fresh random string selected by the challenger. P is able
to respond with a valid content object only if it owns the signing key
linked to nameP , one of its ancestors, or TTP’s signing key.
While our implementation is based on RSA signatures, hierar-
chical identity-based signature (HIBS) [14] schemes represent a
viable alternative. A HIBS scheme is a signature scheme where any
string can be a public (i.e., verification) key. Private (signing) keys
are generated by a key generation center. Given a signing key sk
corresponding to a string s, sk is also a valid signing key for any
string s||t where “||” denotes string concatenation. Moreover, sk
can be used to compute a new signing key sk′ corresponding to s||u
for any string u.
With HIBS, the public key corresponding to a namespace name
is the string representing name. TTP acts as a key generation center
and issues signing keys to producers, each key corresponding to a
namespace.
The main drawback of an implementation based on HIBS is the
lack of support from the current NDN codebase. As such, routers
cannot verify HIBS signatures on content objects. For this reason,
our lighting control prototype relies on RSA signatures.
3.5 Key Attributes & Access Control Policies
All attributes of a public key are expressed using the name under
which such key is published. Each attribute is a name/value pair
expressed as two consecutive namespaces: the first indicates a key
attribute name, and the second – its value.
Recall that an NDN content object is bound to its name by a
public-key signature. According to our trust model, such a signature
must be issued either by the TTP or by the owner of the namespace
that contains the public key. The set of attributes defined in our
framework is detailed in table 1. Applications can extend this set
with new attributes. For example, a public key pkP published under
/ndn/uci/ics/432B/domain/lighting-domain-1/
appname/light-board-1/access/full-access/
expires/20151231235959Z/key specifies that pkP belongs to
application light-board-1 in domain lighting-domain-1, that has “full
Attribute Description
domain application’s domain
appname application identifier
access application’s permissions on the fixture
expires expiration date in
generalized time notation:
(YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ)
Table 1: Attributes
access” to fixtures in such domain. pkP – when published under
such name – is considered invalid after December 31, 2015.
An attribute name can appear more than once with different values.
The combined attribute value is computed as the intersection of all
the instances of such attribute. As with any NDN data packet, the
issuer of content object with payload pkP is specified in the content
object’s key locator field.
3.6 The Protocol
We now introduce the protocol for controlling NDN-connected
light fixtures. The protocol is composed of three sub-protocols:
bootstrapping, application authorization and control.
Bootstrap. New fixtures must be paired with CM and bootstrapped
in order to be able to receive commands from applications. The
pairing process consists of the distribution of a (short) symmetric
key from Fix to CM. For example, in our implementation CM
scans a barcode on Fix’s enclosure, that represents a symmetric key
factory-installed on Fix. Next, CM initializes Fix.
Fixture initialization consists of selecting an NDN name for Fix,
(loosely) synchronizing CM and Fix clocks and installing (on Fix) a
trusted public key that belongs to AM. This public key identifies the
domain under which Fix operates. CM then communicates a signing
key-pair to Fix.2 This key-pair is linked to Fix’s namespace, and
it represents the identity of Fix. Additionally, CM can specify the
NDN name of one or more ACLs that Fix must use to determine ap-
plications’ permissions. At this time, Fix also generates a long-term
secret master key kFix. This key is optionally used later to derive
application-specific symmetric keys (i.e., kApp) for authentication
purposes. Once Fix is correctly initialized, it responds with the
current time and a hash of all the information exchanged during
bootstrap.
Application Authorization. AM grants control privileges to an
application by signing the latter’s public key. Given pkApp belonging
to App and intended permissions permApp, AM first constructs a
namespace nameApp containing “access/permApp”, as specified
in Section 3.5. Then it signs pkApp and publishes it (as content)
under nameApp. Any fixture under control of AM can verify that
App owns permission permApp by asking it to prove ownership of
namespace nameApp, as in Section 3.4.
Control Protocol. The protocol is designed for resource-constrained
fixtures interacting with a large number of applications. Thus, we
aim to minimize computation and communication costs and amount
of memory required to perform interest authentication. We avoid
storing per-application long-term information (e.g. application keys)
on each fixture. A fixtures stores a constant amount of state for each
application currently interacting with it. We emphasize that, in order
to issue and verify commands, applications and fixtures do not need
to communicate with either CM or AM.
ApplicationApp, that owns a key distributed under nameApp/key,
issues an interest with command cmd for fixture Fix with NDN name
nameFix as follows:
2Alternatively, Fix can generate a signing key-pair and communicate the resulting
public key to CM.
nameFix/nameApp/cmd/auth-token
The string “cmd” represents a fixture-specific command. Since our
framework does not specify any particular format for commands,
this string is simply treated as an opaque binary field. For example,
a simple command could be: “on” or “off”, while a more complex
one could be: “intensity/+10/rgb-8bit-color/F0FF39”.
The field auth-token encodes the command authentication to-
ken, constructed as: state || authenticator. The first part rep-
resents state information required to prevent timing and replay at-
tacks. It is, in turn, composed of: sequence number, timestamp
and estimated round-trip time (RTT) between App and Fix. The
authenticator part is a signature or a MAC. In either case, it is
computed over: “nameFix/nameApp/cmd/state”. App signs its
commands using the private counterpart of nameApp/key. The key
used to compute and verify commands authenticated with MAC is
negotiated between App and Fix as detailed below.
When a fixture receives an interest nameFix/nameApp/cmd/
auth-token, it determines whether to execute cmd, as follows:
1. Verifies that cmd is well formed.
2. Examines attributes in nameApp to determine whether App
is allowed to issue cmd (e.g., Fix check whether nameApp
expiration date and access fields).
3. If available, uses a local or remote ACL specified by CM
during the bootstrap phase.
4. Verifies the state of the command. First determines whether
the interest is current (also using the estimated RTT value as
additional information). Then, if it has is no record of previous
commands from App, Fix extracts the sequence number from
auth-token and stores it as: (nameApp, sequence number).
Otherwise, it checks that the stored sequence number is lower
than the one in auth-token.
5. Verifies authenticator – signature or MAC on the interest.
In case of signature, Fix retrieves public key nameApp/key
and stores it in its local cache.
If a pair (nameApp, sequence number) stored by Fix is not up-
dated for a predetermined amount of time, it is considered stale and
deleted. This way, at any given time, a fixture only retains state
information related to active applications.
Ek(·) Symmetric encryption algorithm
(e.g. AES)
H(·) A collision-resistant hash function
(e.g. SHA-256)
MACk(·) Message authentication code
(e.g. HMAC-SHA-256)
PRFk(·) Pseudorandom function
namei NDN name associated with entity i
Table 2: Notation
Symmetric Authentication. By default, fixtures and applications
authenticate commands and acks using public-key signatures. How-
ever, for performance reasons, they can switch to MAC-s at anytime,
which requires establishing a shared secret key. Recall that, at boot-
strap, Fix generates a long-term secret key kFix. When App asks Fix
to switch to symmetric authentication, the latter uses kFix to com-
pute an application-specific key kApp. After verifying that App owns
the namespace nameApp (see Section 3.4), Fix computes kApp =
PRFkFix(nameApp). Then, Fix sends kApp to App encrypted under
public key nameApp/key. Note that Fix does not need to store these
application-specific symmetric keys: it can compute kApp from kFix
whenever needed. Therefore, the amount of symmetric-key-related
state stored by Fix does not depend on the number of authorized
applications.
3.7 Command and Ack Privacy
We now consider privacy of commands and acks. An eaves-
dropper may want to learn various parameters in a command or a
corresponding ack. An application conceals this information by
encrypting the command before constructing the name that goes
into an interest. If symmetric authentication is used, the command
encryption key is derived from the MAC key. If the interest is signed,
the command is encrypted using Fix’s public-key. NDN already
provides a framework for content encryption [36] that we use to
implement ack privacy.
For efficiency reasons, we do not conceal sizes of either com-
mands or acks, thus potentially allowing the adversary to distinguish
among types of commands. Although it is easy enough to intro-
duce padding (though incurring costs), more sophisticated attacks
exploiting side channels (e.g., time required for a fixture to respond
to a command or some other observable feedback) are much more
difficult to address. Since one the main goals of our approach is
generality, we do not implement any countermeasure for this class
of attacks.
3.8 Ack Authentication
While not typical today for lighting, we desire that a fixture and
other actuators should provide feedback after processing a command.
In our NDN context, this naturally results in a closed-loop control
system and allows NDN routers to flush PIT entries corresponding
to processed commands (interests). For obvious security reasons,
acks must be authenticated. (NDN anyhow requires all content to
be signed). However, in resource-constrained environment of light
fixtures, the cost of computing per command (or per ack) public-key
signatures is quite high, especially, considering that a fixture might
receive numerous closely-spaced commands. For this reason, we
propose an NDN extension allowing fixtures to efficiently produce
authenticated command acks.
A natural and efficient alternative to public-key signatures are
symmetric MACs. An application and a fixture could share a key,
and use to authenticate acks, i.e., replace a signature on the con-
tent object (that carries the ack) with a MAC. Unfortunately, this
approach is unworkable if fixtures and applications communicate
through a public network, specifically, if any NDN routers are in-
volved in Fix-App communication. Since MACs are not publicly
verifiable, an intervening NDN router has no means of authenticat-
ing MAC-d content and may simply drop it.
Nonetheless, we view NDN as work-in-progress. Thus, we con-
sider end-to-end MAC-based symmetric authentication of content
as an alternative to publicly verifiable signatures and include it in
the implementation.
Next, we describe two techniques that allow public verifiability
of acks without requiring public-key operations by fixtures, applica-
tions or NDN routers.
Encryption-based Authentication. This technique assumes that
App and Fix share a symmetric key k, itself derived from Fix-App
shared key kApp, which is generated at bootstrap time. To begin,
App generates a random s-bit value x and, using a block cipher
E with block size s, computes y = Ek(x), z = H(x) where E is
used in the ECB mode. App includes the pair (z, y) as part of the
command to Fix. Recall that this command is represented as an
NDN interest and, on the path to Fix, it leaves state in all intervening
NDN routers.
Having received an interest, Fix extracts x′ from y as x′ =
E−1k (y) and re-computes z
′ = H(x′). If z′ 6= z, then Fix aborts;
otherwise, it issues an ack in the form of an empty content object
with x as a signature.
Although x is clearly not an actual signature, this technique allows
public verifiability. An NDN router that observes the (ack) content
object carrying x must have a corresponding interest (and therefore
z) in its PIT. It can efficiently determine the relationship between
the interest and the content by checking whether H(x) ?= z.
Commands that are not acknowledged can be retransmitted until
they time out. Once a command expires, it must be reissued using a
new challenge. Despite public verifiability, App cannot prove to a
third party that it successfully interacted with Fix. This is because
App can unilaterally produce any number of challenge/response
pairs without any interaction with Fix. This motivates a stronger
(hash-chain-based) technique described below.
Hash-Chain-based Authentication. The present technique allows
App to prove to any third party that it successfully interacted with
Fix, with no need for any shared keys; in particular, Fix-App interac-
tions become auditable. This is very useful in certain circumstances.
For example, consider an emergency lighting system: an emergency
response team can issue an “alarm” command to each fixture and
turn on all lights. In case of post-incident investigation, the emer-
gency response team can prove that it issued required commands by
producing acks from the appropriate fixtures. Another example is a
building security system, that, in case of an alarm, needs to trigger
security lights; proving that lights were turned on correctly can be
crucial for subsequent evidence gathering.
However, due to its lock-step feature (see below), this technique
is designed for infrequent use. At the same time, it is appropriate
whenever traditional signature computation by fixtures is too costly
– i.e., when the framework is instantiated on resource-constrained
devices that cannot perform public-key operations.
Hash-chain signature schemes are particularly appealing for low-
powered devices due to the reduced resource burden of traditional
signature schemes, which have lead to several protocols incorpo-
rating their use [3, 8, 5, 38]. Our hash-chain-based authentication
method is somewhat similar to Server-Supported Signatures (S3)
scheme [3]. However, unlike S3, it does not rely on the server and
does not involve the use of public key cryptography in the genera-
tion or verification of ack-s. However, it also does not provide all
functionality offered by S3; in particular, our method can not be
used to authenticate an arbitrary payload.
We denote recursive application of hash function H(·) i times to
input x as Hi(x), i.e., H0(x) = x and Hi(x) = Hi−1(H(x)). A
hash chain is a sequence {x,H1(x), . . . ,H`(x)} for some secret
x and ` > 0. The last link in the chain H`(x) is called an anchor.
Hash chains are commonly used for authentication as follows: Alice
selects a random secret value x and sends H`(x) to Bob through
an authenticated channel. Bob authenticates Alice by challenging
her with the value he currently stores – Hi(x) for some i ≤ `.
Alice responds with a pre-image Hi−1(x) of Hi(x). Since H(·) is
assumed to be collision-resistant, knowledge of Hj(x) with j ≤ i
is required to respond to the challenge.
In our protocol, Fix generates a secret seed x for a hash chainC of
length `. The anchor H`(x), along with other parameters (including
`) is signed by AM or by Fix itself, with its own private key. The
result is essentially a certificate valid for up to ` signatures. Fix
sends this certificate to App, either off-line or on-line, whenever it
depletes the previous hash chain. For each command, App includes
the last value Hi(x) received from Fix. Fix responds to a command
with an ack containing: σ, H`(x) and Hi−1(x). App can then prove
to a third party that it successfully interacted with Fix at least `− i
times by revealing anchor H`(x), the certificate (for the anchor) and
the last preimage Hi(x) received from Fix.
The main drawback is that App cannot issue a new command
until it receives an ack from Fix for its last command. This lock-
Operation Intel ARM
Core2Duo Cortex A8
Create auth. command (RSA-1024) 1.981 ms 21.553 ms
Verify command (RSA-1024) 0.096 ms 0.435 ms
Compute HMAC key from Fix’s secret 0.005 ms 0.046 ms
Create auth. command (HMAC) 0.006 ms 0.067 ms
Verify command (HMAC) 0.013 ms 0.152 ms
Table 3: Performance of RSA and HMAC authenticated com-
mands on Intel and ARM platforms.
step approach makes the technique unsuitable if App needs to have
multiple commands in flight for any given fixture. Moreover, Fix
must use a different hash chain for every controlling application.
Packet Loss. Either the interest from App to Fix or the correspond-
ing ack might be lost. Clearly, App cannot distinguish between the
two cases. After issuing a command, if the ack is not received, App
continues to issue the same interest for a predetermined amount of
time. If still no ack is received , the command is aborted andApp and
Fix fall back to authenticating acks through regular public-key sig-
natures. Fix can easily determine if a received interest corresponds
to a retransmission or to a new command by checking whether the
preimage of the challenge Hi(x) in the interest has already been
revealed. If the command is a re-transmission and the original has
already been acknowledged, Fix simply issues a new ack containing
the pre-image of Hi(x); this requires no computational effort.
4 Prototype Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture,
we implemented a library – called NameCrypt – designed for
lighting control in a theatrical environment. We also deployed it in
an actual theatrical lighting installation. In this setting, applications
and lighting fixtures interact over a local-area network.
Our setup involves three applications: (1) a sequencer that outputs
pre-generated patterns, (2) a controller that uses algorithmic patterns
and (3) a fader. These applications control eleven lights, connected
to five embedded devices (described below). The embedded devices,
in turn, are connected to the lights using KiNet k`inet, a proprietary
Philips protocol which runs on TCP/IP over ethernet.
4.1 Implementation
NameCrypt provides low-level functionality required by our
protocol on top of CCNx. It is implemented in C interfacing to
OpenSSL for cryptographic services and to CCNx for transport. The
target platform of the lighting fixture is an off-the-shelf embedded
device based on the Gumstix Overo Air [19] computer-on-a-module.
This device is running a 600 MHz Texas Instruments OMAP 3503
ARM Cortex-A8 CPU with 256MB RAM. It supports both WiFi and
Fast Ethernet and runs Linux kernel 3.0. In our tests, we used CCNx
version 0.4.0. Our code is portable and has been also successfully
deployed on both Intel-based Mac and Linux computers.
Interests are signed using RSA with a 1024-bit modulus and a
public exponent of 3. This allows for efficient verification, requir-
ing only requires two multiplications. The hash algorithm used in
signature computation is SHA-256. We implemented symmetric
authenticated interests using HMAC with SHA-256.
Each command is associated with a state variable, which con-
tains current time in seconds/microseconds, sequence number corre-
sponding to the command and an estimated round-trip time between
application and light fixture expressed in milliseconds.
Commands are treated as opaque binary strings by NameCrypt.
Since CCNx allows name components to be binary blobs, commands
and authenticators are not encoded in any printable format.
NameCrypt also implements efficient authentication for fixture
acks. Encrypted challenges are implemented using AES-128 as
block cipher and SHA-256 as the hash function. Hash-chain-based
authenticated acknowledgments are based on SHA-256. Our imple-
mentation uses a very simple “pebbling” technique to reduce the
cost of acknowledgment generation: rather than storing the whole
chain (i.e, performing a full lookup) or computing pre-image Hi(x)
from x, fixtures store every 100-th link in the chain. This way,
returning Hi(x) requires, on average, computing 50 hashes. We
emphasize that there are more efficient pebbling technique (e.g.,
[21]) that we can adopt without any changes to our protocol.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
Experiments were performed on a commodity laptop, which runs
the sequencer, controller and fader (see Section 4), and on a low-
powered embedded system (representative of a lighting fixture or
a low-power fixture controller). The laptop uses a 2.53GHz Intel
Core2Duo CPU. The embedded system uses an the Overo platform
detailed above. We evaluated command and ack authentication
micro-benchmarks and discuss performance considerations.
Table 3 shows the results of micro-benchmarks in command
authentication. Time required to generate an RSA signature on
the Intel platform is comparable to typical network latency in a
LAN and does not significantly affect the performance of the whole
protocol. Verification is well below typical network latency on both
platforms. For this reason, we believe that features provided by
digital signatures and their relative low cost justifies their use in an
environment where commands are generated on non-constrained
device. On the other hand, benchmarks show that low-power devices
are not well-suited for generating real-time signatures on commands.
In this case, we recommend the use of HMAC.
Symmetric authentication incurs negligible performance impact.
Fixtures must generate a symmetric key for each application starting
from their secret. This requires far less than a millisecond on our
test devices.
Table 4 shows timing results of ack authentication mechanisms.
Similar to command authentication, digital signatures do not intro-
duce any significant delay on the Intel platform, while signature
generation is relatively expensive on the ARM. Whenever viable,
our tests show HMAC provides adequate performance. However
when public verifiability is required and standard signatures are too
expensive, encrypted challenges are an appealing option, as shown
in Table 4.
Applications and fixtures may want to rely on hash chains for
added functionality. In this case, benchmarks clearly show that
fixtures should use an efficient representation of the hash chain, i.e.,
one that does not force the fixture to re-generate a large portion of
the chain from the secret seed x. With the “pebbling” technique,
challenge-response requires less than a millisecond. All other opera-
tions incur very low overhead on both platforms.
5 Security Analysis
Trust model. In our model the relationship between content objects
can be represented in a undirected graph where each content ob-
ject is a vertex. Various vertices are connected through public-key
signatures. In particular, each edge represents a pair (public-key
signature, key locator) – i.e., a signature is an edge from a content
object carrying a public key to a content object signed by that key,
while a key locator is an edge from a content object to the content
object carrying the corresponding verification key. Vertices carry-
ing public key can have multiple edges, while vertices representing
regular content have only one edge.
Operation Intel ARM
Core2Duo Cortex A8
Sign content object (RSA 1024) 2.018 ms 26.418 ms
Verify content object (RSA 1024) 0.046 ms 1.301 ms
Authenticate/verify (HMAC) 0.006 ms 0.070 ms
Encrypted challenge – create 0.003 ms 0.043 ms
Encrypted challenge – answer 0.001 ms 0.015 ms
Encrypted challenge – verify 0.001 ms 0.015 ms
Hash chain – create 11.350 ms 88.407 ms
Hash chain – answer w/ lookup <0.001 ms <0.001 ms
Hash chain – answer w/o full lookup 5.104 ms 44.196 ms
Hash chain – answer w/ partitioning 0.052 ms 0.443 ms
Hash chain – verify 0.001 ms 0.010 ms
Table 4: Performance analysis of ack authentication. RSA with
public exponent 3; hash chains with 10, 000 elements
A proof of ownership of nameP from producer P to a challenger
C consists of a graph with a path from a vertex Vi, which represents
the content object named by C under nameP , to vertex V0, which
denotes the content object containing TTP’s key. The prefix of the
NDN name of each vertex along the path from V0 to Vi must be
the full namespace of the previous vertex, with the exception of the
vertex signed by the TTP. For this reason, only the TTP or the owner
of a namespace name can elect a user to be the owner of namespace
name/child.
Key Attribute and Access control policies. Let application App
be the owner of a namespace nameApp, which represents a set of
pairs attribute/value as defined in Section 3.5. The goal of our key
attribute and access control policy mechanism is to guarantee that
– without the ownership of additional namespaces – App can only
assign new namespaces to other owners as long as such namespaces
identify more restrictive attribute/value pairs (as defined by specific
applications) than nameApp.
The security of our key attribute and access control policy mech-
anism is based on the security of our trust model. In particular,
our trust model guarantees that App cannot become owner of a
namespace with a prefix that differs from the full name of nameApp
without receiving any additional namespace ownership from TTP
or other applications. This is implied by the well-formedness of the
proof of ownership: each vertex on the path from the TTP’s key to
App’s key must represent a namespace with a prefix corresponding
to the full namespace of the previous vertex – with the exception of
the first vertex after TTP’s key. A proof that shows App’s ownership
of a namespace with a prefix that does not correspond to the full
name of the parent namespace would clearly be invalid.
Symmetric authentication mechanism. We now analyze the
security of our symmetric interest authentication mechanism as de-
fined in Section 3.6. Consider a malicious application ADV whose
goal is to issue correctly authenticated commands for Fix in a names-
pace for whichADV has never received the corresponding symmet-
ric key from Fix. We model this adversary as follows: ADV is al-
lowed to query Fix with any arbitrary namespace namei and receive
the corresponding key ki = PRFkFix(namei). Eventually ADV se-
lects a namespace nadv , never queried to Fix, under which it wants
to be challenged. After revealing nadv ,ADV is allowed access to or-
acleO(nadv)(cmdi), which outputsmi = MACkadv (cmdi) where
kadv = PRFkFix(nadv). nadv cannot be included in subsequent
queries to Fix. The goal of ADV is to issue a pair (cmdadv,madv)
with madv = MACkadv (cmdadv), with cmd never queried before
toO(nadv). In other words,ADV can obtain the symmetric key cor-
responding to any namespace of it’s choice from Fix. Also, ADV
can choose a “target namespace”, nadv , and request commands to
be authenticated using O(nadv). ADV’s goal is to issue a never
requested authenticated command in namespace nadv .
We now sketch how to construct a simulator S that interacts
with challenger C for a secure MAC with key k and uses ADV
as a subroutine. For each query ni from ADV to Fix where ni
was never asked before, S responds with a random value ki. S
stores pairs (ni, ki) in a table that is used to respond consistently
to subsequent queries. Assuming that the PRF used by Fix is se-
cure, ADV cannot distinguish between (truly) random responses
from S and the pseudorandom responses from Fix. S implements
O(nadv)(cmdi) by querying challenger C on cmdi. C returns
m = MACk(cmdi) and S forwards it to ADV . This way, S im-
plicitly sets PRFkFix(nadv) = k without knowing k. Eventually
ADV outputs (cmdadv,madv), and S outputs (cmdadv,madv) as
its response to C. It is easy to see that (cmdadv,madv) is a well
formed pair command/authenticator iff MACk(cmdadv) = madv .
Since we assume that MAC is secure, ADV can only output such
pair with negligible probability.
Encryption-based Ack Authentication. The goal of our encryption-
based ack authentication protocol is to prevent an adversary ADV
from acknowledging a command cmd on behalf of – and without
any help from – Fix. We argue that, if H is hard to invert and E is
a secure block cipher – i.e., E implements a pseudorandom permu-
tation – then ADV has only negligible probability of generating a
valid ack for cmd.3
We model ADV as follows:it interacts with a challenger by re-
questing pairs (yi, zi) = (Ek(xi),H(xi)) for a value xi of its
choice. Eventually, ADV receives a challenge (y, z) corresponding
to a random x selected by the challenger. ADV’s goal is to output a
value x′ such that H(x′) = z.
We argue that the existence of such adversary – which outputs a
correct z′ with non-negligible probability – would either violate the
security of the block cipher or the one-wayness of the hash function.
In particular, it would allow the construction of either a distinguisher
that sets apart the output of E from a truly random string of the same
size, or a simulator Sadv that inverts H.
First, we observe that ADV cannot distinguish between pairs
(Ek(x),H(x)) and (r,H(x)) where r is a random value of the same
size as the block size of E. If ADV could distinguish between
the two with non-negligible advantage, it could be trivially used to
build a distinguisher that sets apart the output of a pseudorandom
permutation from a truly random string of the same size.
We define Sadv as follows: it receives a challenge y = H(x) for a
random x chosen by a challenger C. Sadv must compute a value x′
such that H(x′) = y. Sadv answers ADV’s queries xi by returning
(ri,H(xi)), where ri is a random value of appropriate size. It also
stores pairs (xi, ri) to answer consistently to subsequent queries.
ADV can only detect the simulation by determining that ri is not
the output of E. However, we argued above that this is possible only
with negligible probability.
Eventually ADV requests a challenge and Sadv responds with
(y, r) for a fresh random r. ADV can detect the simulation only if
there exist an index i such that xi = x, which can happen only with
negligible probability.
Finally, ADV outputs x′. Sadv outputs the same value to answer
the challenge from C. It is easy to see that Sadv successfully inverts
H(·) iff ADV’s output is correct. Therefore, ADV can only forge
authenticated acks with negligible probability.
3Our scheme is also secure if E is any CPA-secure encryption scheme with efficiently
sampleable ciphertext space. In this case, the value r in pairs (r,H(x)) in the security
discussion must be selected from the ciphertext space of E.
Hash-chain-based Ack Authentication. We consider an adver-
sary ADV that can control the communication channel between
App and Fix – e.g. it can drop, modify, inject, delay, or replay any
packet between the two parties. The goal of ADV is to produce an
authenticated ack to any command issued by App for which Fix has
not yet responded.
In our hash-chain-based protocol, upon completion of an authen-
ticated command ADV from App containing challenge Hi(x), Fix
reveals preimage p in its acknowledgment, such that H(p) = Hi(x),
i.e., p = Hi−1(x). If App fails to receive an authenticated ack from
Fix, it reissues cmd until either: 1. App receives p; or 2. after a
predefined timeout. We emphasize that App does not issue a new
command cmd until it receives an ack for cmd from Fix.
If App deviates from this behavior, the protocol is insecure: con-
sider the scenario where App issues cmd for which it receives no
ack. Then App issues a new command cmd′ 6= c. Since no preim-
age was received for cmd, App has no other option but to construct
cmd′ using the same challenge as in cmd. Assume that Fix re-
sponded to cmd and ADV dropped the ack after learning p. From
now on ADV can acknowledge any command issued with the same
challenge, which is clearly undesirable.
Since the same challenge is never used twice, ADV cannot issue
an authenticated ack without receiving the corresponding preimage
from Fix. However, since commands are authenticated, Fix reveals
a preimage only if the command has not been altered by ADV and
has been successfully executed. For this reason, ADV can only
acknowledge commands successfully executed by Fix.
We now show App is able to prove to a third party its successful
interaction with Fix. In order to do so, App must produce the
preimage p = Hi−1(x), and an anchor H`(x) signed by AM. We
point out that App is unable to produce p unless it receives an
authenticated ack from Fix – which contains p.
Assume that, givenHi(x), App can produce pwithout interacting
with Fix. Since App has no additional information on the hash
chain, the only way for App to compute p from Hi(x) is to invert
H(·). Therefore App can only succeed in producing a valid proof
of interaction with negligible probability.
We emphasize that p does not depend on the actual command
it acknowledges. For this reason, a proof of interaction does not
suffice to determine which command it corresponds to. However if
A is authorized to issue only a command cmd with no parameters,
then p successfully shows that Fix must have acknowledged cmd.
6 Related Work
As discussed in Section 1.3, we target a hybrid design space that
draws from both the lighting control and building automation worlds.
Here we summarize related work in both areas.
Digital lighting control plays a key role in both building automa-
tion and entertainment settings. (In fact, their use in the latter often
leads the way in technical innovation [25, 22].) Most current pro-
tocols are descended from legacy control architectures based on
serial communication [25]. These legacy architectures rely on a
separate communication infrastructure. In this context, availability,
integrity, privacy and authentication are not an issue since outsiders
are assumed to have no access to the communication media.
In order to reduce deployment cost and to evolve such archi-
tectures to building- and campus-wide installations, vendors have
introduced ways to transport legacy protocol data over IP [2]. This
provides great flexibility, allowing devices to reuse already-deployed
communication infrastructures such as Ethernet, WiFi, or other IP-
compatible media. In this transition from serial to IP, vendors have
rarely implemented additional security measures [32], likely to avoid
increasing development and deployment costs and in order to maxi-
mize compatibility. As a consequence, such protocols must be often
run over VLANs, VPNs [20], IPSec [32] or physically segregated
networks. Physical segregation is often difficult or even impossible
when protocols are running over RF. In this case several of them
have been show to be insecure [32].
Below we introduce the main protocols in use and briefly discuss
their security features or lack thereof.
DMX/DMX512. Most modern lighting control protocols descend
from or implement DMX512 [9], which is an industry standard mul-
tidrop serial protocol based on RS-485. In the past, each serial DMX
cable provided 512 one-byte control channels updated at a maximum
rate of 44Hz. In DMX nomenclature a link addressing 512 devices is
considered a universe. Modern lighting control systems encapsulate
DMX payload over modern media such as wired/wireless Ethernet
[2] or RF [10]. This has resulted in various competing technologies
such as Art-Net [2], ACN [25], ETCNet/ETCNet2 [12] which bridge
lighting systems and allow them to coexist with newer technology
and integrate into BAS.
Art-Net. Art-Net [2] is a proprietary protocol with open specifica-
tions for transporting DMX signal over UDP. It uses wireless/wired
Ethernet as communication medium; devices self-configure IP ad-
dresses based on the hardware MAC address, and use broadcast
transmission for communication. Art-Net does not offer any form
of authentication or encryption. Reliance on broadcast and lack of
security clearly shows that Art-Net was designed to run on local
(access restricted) networks. In [31], Newton shows how to run
Art-Net over VPN to overcome some of the protocol’s limitations.
Architecture for Control Networks (ACN). ACN [25] is a set
of ANSI standards which define a protocol suite for controlling
lighting, networked entertainment devices, and existing control
systems. It has been designed to address several shortcomings
of existing lighting control protocols, specifically (1) having both an
open protocol and specification, (2) media agnostic control, and (3)
generalizing to any device that can be controlled [25]. ACN defines
several protocols on top UDP, and therefore naturally extends to
any medium that can carry IP communication. There are several
implementations of ACN. As an example, OpenACN [33] and the
current generation of ETCNet [12] implement the ACN standard.
Security is not addressed in this standard, which assumes that
ACN data is transported over a secure network.
Proprietary Protocols. Alongside aforementioned lighting control
protocols, there are proprietary vendor-centric solutions, such as
Philips Dynalite and Philips KiNET. Philips Dynalite is designed
for controlling lighting, interfacing to HVAC, security, fire detection
systems, and other building sensors [11]. The control protocol uses
multi-drop serial over twisted pair and its characteristics are similar
to DMX. Philips KiNET [26] is a contemporary proprietary lighting
protocol based on the Philips Color Kinetics platform for LED
lighting technology. It uses Ethernet as its communication media.
To the best of our knowledge, KiNET does not offer any form of
authentication or encryption between devices.
6.1 Common BAS protocols
In contrast with lighting, BAS protocols interconnect multitudes
of sensors and actuators across a building, including HVAC, build-
ing controls, as well as home and office lighting. The turnkey
nature of these systems combined with the need to inter-operate
in more complex buildings has led to both manufacturer-specific
protocols and standardization of Internet protocols in order to con-
verge and distribute control to these systems. As a result, there
are several BAS that have gained widespread adoption. We review
most prominent solutions: KNX [27] (formerly EIB), Fieldbus [13],
LonTalk/LonWorks [29], and BACNet [1].
BACNet. BACNet [1] is an open standard specifying a protocol
at the backbone level to communicate with devices at the control
level. Although fixtures can support BACNet directly, one of the
primary goals of BACNet is interoperability with other BAS. For the
backbone level, various data link and physical media technologies
have been specified based on existing technology, such as Ethernet,
IP (separately as BACNet/IP), LonTalk, etc.
This standard supports encryption and authentication, although
it has been shown to be insecure [32, 20, 39, 15, 17]. DES is
the only supported block cipher, and the authentication technique
is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks [32]. Moreover, the
protocol does not offer protection against interleaving and replay
attacks [32]. In the last decade, there have been several efforts aimed
at securing BACNet, e.g. Robin et al. [34].
KNX/EIB. KNX began as an open standard – superseding the
legacy European Installation Bus (EIB) – converging several existing
standards in home automation and intelligent buildings. Typical
KNX deployments are used to manage a multitude of building
control applications, such as lighting, HVAC, energy management
and metering. KNX supports a variety of communication media
such as Radio (KNX-RF), Infrared and Powerline.
As outlined in [16, 15, 17], KNX provides no data security. The
control communication to the fixture is limited to a rudimentary
access control scheme. The access control scheme uses access levels
to define privileges ranging from 0 (highest privilege) to 255 (lowest
privilege). Each access level supports a 4-byte password stored and
transmitted in clear-text. Two extensions proposed to improve the
security of KNX are EIBsec [16] and a method combining Diffie-
Hellman and AES [4].
Cavalieri et al. [4] present an extension to the KNX application
layer that uses a configuration manager placed in the control plane
to distribute keys to fixtures using Diffie-Hellman [7]. This key
exchange is used to establish a secure challenge, followed by a
challenge-response protocol to authenticate the parties. A long-term
key is established for use with AES. This proposal specifies no
security model, and protocol details are insufficient to evaluate its
security.
LonTalk/LonWorks. LonTalk is the communication protocol for
the LonWorks BAS. It supports several media types, such as RF,
Infrared, Coaxial cable, and Fiber Optics. It is a major competitor
of KNX and is currently in widespread use in building automation.
As specified in [32, 35, 16, 15, 17], LonTalk provides minimal
security. The only security feature is a protocol for data origin
authentication in both unicast and multicast. Each entity is limited
to a single key of up to 48 bits. All entities must share the same key
if they want to verify messages amongst each other. No security
mechanism is provided to distribute keys. Thus, each device must be
bootstrapped off-line, in a secure environment. Significant overhead
is incurred for authentication as the protocol requires a 4-round
challenge-response protocol invoked for each message the sender
transmits.
Fieldbus. Fieldbus [13] is traditionally used in industrial automa-
tion and control. It is an open architecture with published IEC
standards, which has lead to industry adoption and proliferation of
several vendors. Its specification defines a communication bus proto-
col for monitoring sensors and operating actuators. The technology
has been later adapted to building automation and control.
As outlined by Tretyl et al. [37], in-band security mechanisms
for Fieldbus implementations offer weak security. Most implemen-
tations offer rudimentary access control and authentication where
passwords are sent over the network in cleartext. Security of a
typical Fieldbus deployment relies on network isolation. [37] also
proposes the use of standard mechanisms for securing communica-
tions in Fieldbus deployments, e.g., SSL/TLS and IPSec.
Proprietary Protocols. There are several contenders in the BAS
ecosystem with proprietary protocols, such as Siemens and Honey-
well. Since published specifications are scarce we do not overview
these systems.
7 Summary and Future Work
This paper focused on securing instrumented environments con-
nected via Content-Centric Networking (CCN), motivated by the
increasing integration of Building Automation Systems (BAS) with
enterprise networks and the Internet. In particular, we explore light-
ing systems over Named-Data Networking (NDN), a prominent
instance of CCN. We identified security requirements in lighting
control and constructed a concrete NDN-based security architec-
ture. We then analyzed its security properties and reported on the
prototype implementation and experimental results.
Clearly, this work represents only the initial step towards assess-
ing suitability of NDN for communication settings far from its forte
of content distribution. Much more work is needed to securely adapt
NDN to other types of instrumented environments. Lighting control
is, in some ways, simpler than other BAS types. For example, we
assumed a limited model of feedback in which most of the time
command acks are basically one-bit values. This allowed us to
use tricks based on hash chains or encrypted challenges to obtain
efficiency. In other circumstances, acks may be more expressive.
Our current design does not support multicast communication. In
order for a group of fixtures to be synchronously commanded by
the same application, each fixture needs to issue a separate interest
to the application at roughly the same time. The application could
then issue a command that would reach all “interested” fixtures.
Another direction worth exploring is the utility of long-lived
interests, i.e., interests that establish state in NDN routers but do
not expire quickly. This can be useful if we allow fixtures to issue
interests to controlling applications (rather than the other way around
as we do now). A fixture Fix would issue an interest to App and
the latter would only emit corresponding content when it has a
command for Fix. This would require Fix to periodically refresh
interests as they expire and get flushed by routers.
While not discussed in detail here, NDN offers other significant
benefits to BAS applications that have motivated this exploration,
such as providing network access to sensing and actuation points
via application-assigned data names, without the need to specify IP
host addresses and port numbers for gateways.
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